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CASE NOTES
noted," however, if the courts are to apply the Code they must look at it
not only as originally written, but also as adopted and enforced in the
various states.
In summary, the decision in the instant case raises the question of the
future applicability of the UCC in federal courts deciding cases affecting the
rights of the United States. While this decision does not stand for the prop-
osition that the Code must govern, it hopefully indicates that the federal
courts will, in the future, make more use of the UCC.
E. CARL UEHLEIN
Labor Law—Secondary Boycotts—Permissibility of Consumer Picket-
ing—Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 8 (b)
(4) (ii).—NLRB v. Fruit El Vegetable Packers El Warehousemen, Local
760.'—This action was begun on a complaint issued by the Tree Fruits Labor
Relations Committee, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Tree Fruits), on charges
that a strike caused by a dispute over the terms of the renewal of a collective
bargaining agreement with Teamsters, Local 760, constituted such conduct
as would violate Section 8(b) (4), subsections (i) and (ii) of the National
Labor Relations Act (hereafter referred to as the NLRA) as amended by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) .2
The case was submitted directly to the National Labor Relations Board
on a stipulation of facts, namely, that Local 760 had called a strike against
the members of Tree Fruits and in support of said strike had instituted a
consumer boycott against the struck product. Local 760 had placed pickets
at the customer entrances of Safeway Retail Stores, distributors of the pro-
duce of the struck firms. The pickets, by placards and handbills, appealed
to Safeway customers, and the public generally, to refrain from purchasing
such struck produce. Care was taken to emphasize that the strike was not
20
 Supra note 17.
1
 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
2
 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 (1958), as amended by 704(a) of the Labor-
Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 28 U.S.C. 158
(1961 Supp.) reads in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) (1) ... to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person .. .
to engage in, a strike or a refusal ... to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . . where . . • an object
thereof is-
.
(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any
other person
. .
Provided further, That . . . nothing contained in such paragraph shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public. . . .
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directed at the retailer nor was the support of his employees requested. At
no time during the picketing had any work stoppages, interruption of de-
liveries or pickups, interference with either the normal handling of the struck
produce or of the ingress and egress of customers occurred.
The Board held that the Landrum-Griffin Act prohibited consumer
picketing in front of a secondary establishment, i.e., Safeway.3 On petition
by both parties to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
the Board's order was set aside and remanded. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. HELD: Secondary picketing of retail stores confined to persuad-
ing customers to cease buying the product of a primary employer did not
fall within the area of secondary consumer picketing condemned as an unfair -
labor practice, even if the picketing was effective in reducing the secondary
employer's sales of the primary employer's product, possibly leading to the
secondary employer dropping the item as a poor seller.
To fully comprehend the import of the Court's decision in the area of
consumer picketing, a brief summary of legislation in the area is imperative.
Section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA of 1947 4 was addressed to the problems caused
by secondary boycotts.° The purpose of the legislation was to prohibit sec-
ondary picketing; but as subsequent litigation was to demonstrate, the at-
tempt was deficient since various technical loopholes continued to allow
unions a wide range of unhampered picketing with regard to secondary
premises and employers .° Although the enactment prohibited the inducement
and encouragement of strikes on the part of secondary employees, it failed
to provide for control of the same tactics when directed solely at the sec-
ondary employer.' This construction of the NLRA provision allowed labor
a considerable area in which the application of economic sanctions against a
secondary party via a secondary boycott could be effectively utilized.
The obvious failure of the legislation enacted in 1947 to cope with the
problem of union application of secondary pressures led Congress in 1959
to seek its amendment.° The purpose of such an amendment, as declared by
the then Senator Kennedy, was to plug the technical loopholes in the provi-
3
 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961). The complaint charged violations of both subsections
(i) and (ii), but the Board held that picketing, directed at consumers only, did not
violate subsection (i).
4
 61. Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment ..
to perform any services. ..
This should be contrasted with the amended version, supra note 2.
5 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951).
6
 For a discussion of the technical loopholes in the Taft-Hartley Act and the at-
tempted remedy by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, see Farmer, Secondary Boycotts—
Loopholes Closed or Reopened, .52 Geo. L.J. 217 (1964).
7 See the concurring opinion of Board Chairman Farmer in International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 1788 (1954).
8
 105 Cong. Rec. 15673 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959); Legislative History of LMRDA,
1959 (NLRB ed., 1959), Vol. II, p. 1615.
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sions dealing with secondary boycotts .° The pertinent amending provision
is an additional clause which extends the enactment to cover union pressure
imposed directly upon the secondary employer.° It is the extent to which this
new section curtails consumer picketing without a factual showing of threats
and coercion that is at issue in the principal case.
Since its enactment, section 8 (b) (4) (ii) has spawned two schools of
thought regarding the manner in which it is to be interpreted." These two
views conflict both as to the scope and emphasis of the provision. The first,
the "literal" approach, pressed by the NLRB and the Fifth Circuit, maintains
that the end result of the provision is to declare that all secondary picketing
per se effects coercion and restraint," since such picketing is in the nature
of economic retaliation." This theory is based upon the literal wording of
the enactment and the accompanying "publicity proviso" as well as the in-
terpretive gloss of the drafters." It should be noted that the main emphasis
of the "literal" approach is that the amendment is aimed primarily at pro-
hibiting the picketing of a secondary employer, without reference to the
motives or methods of the picketers.
The second interpretation of the provision has been advanced by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in its argument that
the intent of Congress was not to abolish all secondary picketing, but only
to abolish picketing of a secondary employer if such conduct constitutes
in fact the equivalent of threats, coercion or restraints.° The court also
proposed a test by which such an equation could be measured, i.e., whether
the secondary employer suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss. 10 This
latter view, the more liberal of the two, is premised on the opinion that the
main emphasis of the provision is directed against threatening and coercive
tactics and not the prohibition of union activity which did not entail threats
or coercion. In light of this approach, the court of appeals construed the
"publicity proviso" as exempting from regulation publicity other than picket-
ing even though it was of a threatening or coercive nature.
The clash of these opposing theories was before the Supreme Court in
the present controversy. In its opinion the Court rejected the approach of
per se prohibition and adopted the more liberal view." The Court affirmed
9 105 Cong. Rec. 16413 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959); Legislative History of LMRDA,
1959 (NLRB ed., 1959), Vol. II, p. 1431.
10 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 28 U.S.C. § 158(4)(ii) (1961 Supp.).
11 For an extended comparison of these conflicting theories, see Desmond, Consumer
Picketing: The Limited Restrictions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 4 B.C.
Ind. Sr Corn. L. Rev. 79 (1962) , ; Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 806 (1964).
12 Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963); Upholsterers Frame & Bedding
Workers, Twin City Local 61 (Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 40
(1961).
13 United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees, Local 261, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960).
14 Ibid.
15 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 308 F.2d 311
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
16 Ibid.
17 [Olur holding today simply takes note of the fact that a broad condemnation
of peaceful picketing, such as that urged upon us by petitioners, has never been
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that a statute, making it an unfair labor practice to coerce any person to
cease selling the products of any other person, does not prohibit all consumer
picketing at a secondary site. In support of its position, the Court went
beyond the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Act and drew upon the
tenets of national labor policy culled from prior federal regulation of labor
relations.' 8 The Court also relied on the absence of any specific prohibition
against consumer picketing in the provision, arguing that such a specific
condemnation would have been inserted had Congress intended a blanket
prohibition as was urged by the Board 1° The majority opinion dismissed,
without prolonged discussion, a portion of the legislative history of the amend-
ments which had been relied on by the Board and by the Fifth Circuit. The
majority cited the authority of Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
in which the Court counseled that:
[T] he fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide
to the construction of the legislation. It is the sponsors that we look
to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt. 2°
Although rejecting the "literal" approach and affirming the result reached
by the District of Columbia Circuit, the Court refused to affirm the test of
"economic loss" as applied by that appellate court and in its stead relied
upon a distinction well established in state labor cases prior to 1940. 21 This
distinction hinges upon the difference between picketing a secondary em-
ployer merely to follow the struck goods, and picketing designed to result in
a generalized loss of patronage to the secondary employer. 22 On this basis the
Court preferred to gear its test more to the motives and methods of union
adopted by Congress, and an intention to do so is not revealed with that "clearest
indication in the legislative history," which we require.
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, supra note 1, at 71.
18 Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations, Congress has
consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing except where it is used as a means to
achieve specific ends which experience has shown are undesirable. Id. at 62.
18
 Note that to base the conclusion that Congress intended a blanket prohibition
by indirection on the wording of the publicity proviso, is to construe the proviso as the
master, rather than the servant, of the subsection. Such a construction would conflict with
the history of legislative Interpretation, since the function of a proviso is to limit, not
expand, that which precedes it. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825). See also Previant,
The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary Boycott Sections: A Critical Analysis, 48 Geo.
L.J. 346, 352-54 (1960).
20
 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
21 See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 123 (1940).
22 The distinction was sometimes justified on the ground that the secondary em-
ployer, who was presumed to receive a competitive benefit from the primary employer's
non-union, and hence lower wage scales, was in "unity of interest" with the primary
employer, Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937); and sometimes
on the ground that picketing, restricted to the primary employer's product is a "primary
boycott against the merchandise." Chiate v. United Cannery Agricultural Packing &
Allied Workers of America, 2 CCH Lab. Cas. 185-86 (1937). The latter is the rationale
adopted by the Court in the present case. It is interesting, however, to note the former
rationale in connection with the hypothetical situation, regarding the secondary party
who distributes solely the struck product.
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activity than to the result of such activity upon the secondary party. 28 The
Court considered that:
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined
to the primary dispute. . . . On the other hand, when consumer
picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with
the secondary employer, . . . [it is] pressure designed to inflict
injury on his business generally. In such case, the union does more
than merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dis-
pute with the secondary employer. 24
Though it can be argued that the result of both these forms of consumer
picketing will be adverse to the interests of the secondary party, it must be
recalled that the statute is not a guarantee of immunity from economic loss
to the secondary employer, but rather an attempt to immunize him from union
use of coercive tactics aimed at controlling his choice of those with whom he
shall transact his business.
In its use of the term "coercive," Congress necessarily was cognizant
of the necessity of striking a balance between the protection of the union's
right under the First Amendment to appeal to the public, and on the other
hand, the promulgation of effective regulations to combat union utilization
of methods such as threats and intimidations. Since picketing, as a method
of appeal, involves more than ordinary free speech 25
 and exceeds the bounds
of protected speech, it is subject to a greater degree of regulation. Neverthe-
less, "the mere fact that there is 'picketing' does not automatically justify
its restraint without an investigation into its conduct and purposes."8° It is
important to note that in dealing with picketing in the past, the Court has
recognized that as a process it utilizes economic and social pressures, and
yet the Court "has refused to uphold any legislation which amounted to a
blanket prohibition of picketing." 27
 The Court has upheld restrictions, as in
Hughes v. Superior Court, 28
 but only on the basis that, in addition to these
accompanying pressures, there can be detected influences and consequences
which are different from those of other modes of communication. The Court
attributes to Congress, in light of the absence of clear and concise language
to the contrary, an intent to follow the Hughes rationale rather than revive
the previously rejected per se prohibition." The Court is thus in keeping with
the judicial position that per se rules are inconsistent with the language and
23 Note that the Court adopted the same emphasis rather than a per se approach in
NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 54 (1964).
24 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, supra note 1,
at 72.
25 Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
26
 Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1957).
27
 Chauffeurs Local Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per curiam); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
28 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
29 See cases cited supra note 27.
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purpose of section 8 (b) (4). 3° Regarding this point, it is of consequence that
the Board has similarly rejected per se rules as applicable to section 8(b) (4)
(i), and concluded that any determination should be based on all the evidence
in the particular case and not by an a priori assumption. 31
Based on this rejection of blanket rules and upon the absence of any
statutory language which could reveal any intent to radically alter judicial
precedent, the Court has correctly interpreted that what Congress condemned
as coercion was not picketing per se but only picketing which is the equivalent
of a boycott against the secondary employer generally. This would seem to
be in keeping with its determination in NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 that
"[S]ection 13 [of the Act] is a command of Congress to the courts to re-
solve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation . . . which safe-
guards the right to strike."82
In the final evaluation of the decision, it must be emphasized that in
validating consumer picketing, when limited to the struck produce, the Court
does so on the finding that the appeal did not affect the secondary employer
in any way except through the medium of customer product preference. Even
allowing for the limiting effect of these controlled circumstances on the
decision, an increase of union activity in the area of consumer appeals is
to be expected, not necessarily limited to the utilization of placard-carrying
union members. 33
PETER J. NORTON
Patents—Torts—Inventor's Right to Professional Credit—"Droit
Moral"—Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.—Misani
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp) 
—Defendant employed plaintiff as a chem-
ist, subject to a standard assignment to the defendant of all plaintiff's in-
ventions developed during her employment. Plaintiff claimed that, while so
employed, she invented a chemical compound and the process for making it.
Plaintiff's supervisor, also a defendant, alleged that this discovery was made
under his direction as part of a long-term inventive process in which he was
developing the compound. On this basis, and as agent for the defendant
company, he filed for a patent, naming himself as inventor. Following the
issuance of the patent, plaintiff protested defendant's claim to inventorship,
but her protest was dissolved when the Patent Office disallowed the patent
on the ground that the compound was unpatentable. Although defendant
3° United Wholesale Employees Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Brewery Workers Local 366, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959).
31
 Brief for Respondents, pp. 10-11, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Ware-
housemen, Local 760, supra note 1.
22
 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1959).
33
 The International Ladies Garment Workers Union has distributed to the general
public shopping bags bearing the message, "JUDY BOND INC. ON STRIKE—DON'T
BUY JUDY BOND BLOUSES," thereby creating, in effect, consumer pickets, an in-
teresting innovation. Barmash, Behind Those Shopping Bags, N.Y. Herald Tribune, July
26, 1964 (Magazine), p. 10.
83 N.J. Super. 1, 198 A.2d 791 (1964).
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